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FOR RELEASE FRIDAY A.M., 1'1arch 16, 1973
CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES
THE NEW CONGRESS AND THE NEW CHINA:

AN AGENDA FOR ACTION

Remarks of Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)
before the
Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Study
Washington, D.

c.

Thursday, March 15, 1973

8:15 P. M.
With Peking as the epi-center, the pattern of international relationships in Asia has undergone a series of earthquakes.

The repercussions have been deep and pervading.

When

a new structure of stability emerges in the Western Pacific,
it will manifest far-reaching changes.

The main factors of

change are already evident and I who uld like to list them at
the outset.
(1)

The tragic

u.

S. involvement in the war in

Indochina is, hopefully, at its tortured, dragged-out end .
U.

s.

military power is moving off the Asian mainland.
(2)

~fuether

the character of the People's Republic

has changed or our perceptions of China have improved is moot;
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the United States has elected, at last, to close out the un declared war 3 the cold war, the proxy war, the peripheral war
with the Chinese People's Republic .

In turn, we have fo und

the Chinese leadership in Peking most accommodating .
(3)

In a period of spreading peace, Japan possesses

the most dynamic economy in Asia.

The Japanese have skirted

the Taiwan quicksands and have come, instead, to terms with
the new China .

They are now embarked on a multi-directional

diplomacy built on the base of a vast foreign trade.

Japan

moves still, with intense awareness of th e United States, but
no lon ger in the shadow 0f U. S . policy.
(4)

To whatever depth the wedge has been driven

between the Soviet Union and China, no signs point to imminent
extraction; in the circumstances, Soviet policies which appear
to be in a state of abeyance in Asia, remain uncertain and
enigmatic .
An ancient Chinese proverb says that "a journey of
1, 000 miles begins with a single step. 11

Actually it says a

- 3 "journey n.f 333 1/3 miles."
tendency to overstate

But with an ancient American

anything involving China, we have even

managed to inflate its proverbs.

In any event, the first step

and several more have already been taken in Sino-U. S. reconciliation.

China and the United States are now moving rapidly

towards the normal relationships of peace.

This change has been

produced by the combined talents of the nation's political community, as typified by the President, and of the Academic community, as represented by Dr. Kissinger.

Democrats can hardly

ride the President's coattails on the China question, nor, for
that matter, can other Republicans.

Whether Johns Hopkins can

claim a share of cridit for Harvard's contribution, I leave to
your judgment.
It will help to understand how .far we have come in
Sino-U.

s.

relations if we look for a moment at the old China

policy which was washed away in the Chou-Nixon toasts in Peking
last winter.

That pnlicy was nne of boycott and ostracism and

it can be said to have begun with the inauguration of the

- 4 People's Republic of China in Peking in 1949.

At that time,

we saw not the birth of new hope in China, but rather the dashing
of our hopes for a durable peace after World War II.

The new

government was viewed as not Chinese at all, but rather as an
alien outpost of a worldwide Communist conspiracy led by the
Soviet Union.

We told ourselves that it was bound to be short-

lived, soon to be overthrown by the righteous wrath of the
Chinese people.
This interpretation may seem somewhat incredible toda:r.
However, I can assure those of you who are too yo ung to remember
that it was the prevailing interpretation a quarter of a century
ago.

It was an interpretation spawned largely by the anxieties,

fears and angers generated in the cataclysmic upheaval of the
Chinese revolution.
In view of the distorted depiction of the new China

in 1949 and the sense of betrayal to which it gave rise in this
country, it is not surprising that American public life came to
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be dominated by a nationwide witch-hunt.
search went out for the culprits

11

Everywhere t h e

who had lost China. 11

Educa-

tors, politicians, journalists, ministers, bureaucrats, businessmen or whatever--none was exempt from the field-day of the
ideological carpet-baggers.

In the atmosphere of those times,

rational discussion soon gave way to a massive bi-partisan
denunciation of the new China.

Indeed, Democrats vied with

Republicans in expressing a hostile aversion to what had
emerged in Peking.
The American mood in 1949 was one of fear, frustration
and fury.

Spearheaded by these emotions, it is little wonder

t hat we moved, almost eagerly, into the devastating peripheral
war with China in Korea.

Simultaneously, our diplomacy plunged

us into the middle of the Taiwan problem and opened the door to
eventual direct military involvement in Indochina and Southeast
Asia.

Everywhere in Asia,

11

containment of China 11 was enshrined

as a cardinal ob jective of our policies.

- 6 After the Korean truce and the Geneva Accords of 1954
the wings of a Sino-U.

s.

reconciliation beat feebly from time

to time but never with sufficient strength to dispell a smoldering mutual resentment .

For many years, Department of State

representatives maintained intermittent contact with Chinese
diplomats in Europe .

At no time, however, did these meetings

confront the major issues .

While European and other nations

were coming to terms with the People ' s Republic, the United
States under successive PresidentsJ reaffirmed time and again
that Taiwan was China.

Insofar as this nation was concerned,

Peking was then and forever consigned to international limbo .
The Executive Branch engineered and Congress financed
a ring of military compacts around China 's borders .

Links in

the chain were formed by SEATO and Mutual Defense treaties with
the Republic of China on Taiwan, Japan and the Republic of Korea .
With these treaties came a strengthening of the U.

s.

base structure throughout Asia and the quasi -permanent

military

- 7 dep l oyment of ten s of thousands of
bases.

u.

S. t r oops tn man the

Tens of billions of dollars poured forth for our

forces in the Far East and for massive aid and thousands of
advisors to allies, new and old .
A stringen t boycott was clamped on all trade with
the Chinese mainland .
off .

Cultural and nther contacts were shut

It became illegal to purchase even a pair of chopsticks

in Hong Kong if they were fashioned in China, or to sell the
Chinese a pair of shoe-laces, even by way of a
factory in Canada .

u.

S .-owned

As for our understanding of the new China,

what we learned, we learned second - hand and more often than not
through the distorting prisms of Taiwan and Hong Kong .

An

American newsman who had the temerity to journey to China in
the face of an Executive Branch prohibition on all such travel
was

compelle~

subsequently, to go to court to obtain a pass-

port to ply his trade abroad .
It was almost as though we were determined to blot
out of our ken the very existence of the Chinese mainland and
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what was transpiring thereon.

Even when serious difficulties

emerged in Soviet-Chinese relations, we were at first incredulous and suspected a joint plot aimed at the "Free World."
It was only much later that we were prepared to acknowledge the
reality and abandon the concept of a worldwide Communist monolith based on Moscow.
In doing so, however, we did not change our view of
the government in Peking.

We still saw the People 1 s Republic

as a reckless, belligerent and powerful Chinese dragon with its
corralling as the end purpose of our Asian policies and programs,
All the while, it is now apparent, the Chinese people were seein g
themselves as a beleaguered, undeveloped country, beset on all
sides by enemies who had been marshalled by the Un ited States
to undo the achievements of the Chinese revolution.;
It is now known that during these years of ostracism,
the Chinese stress was not on aggression beyond their borders,
but on military defense of their own territory.

It is now

known, too, that the maximum emphasis of these years was given
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to production for peaceful purposes.
occupied with

feeding~

The Chinese were pre-

clothing and sheltering three-quarters

of a billion people and with developing a social and economic
structure which would give durability to the ideology of
Mao Tse-tung.

In

retrospect~

it is clear that we expended

billions in Asia to deter what we believed was an aggressive
China at precisely the time when Chinese energies were being
redirected away from militant revolution into militant social
reconstruction.
The gash in our understanding was largely selfinflicted.

To a large

extent~

as I have indicated, we cut our-

selves off from what was happening inside China.
this exercise in ostrichism is

incalculable.

The cost of

It had much to

do with leading more than two and a half million Americans into
the military quagmires of the Asian mainland.

Th irty-three

thousand Americans never retu rned from the hills and valleys of
Korea where many died in unnecessary conflict with vast Chinese
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armies north of the 38th parallel.

Another 46,000 Americans

gave their lives in the paddies and jungles of Indochina.
The $150 billion, plus, cost of the Vietnamese war pales in
comparison with the tragedy of devastated lives, of a shattered
national unity and of the decline in the general sense of wellbeing of the nation .
Nevertheless, the dollar price of this misbegotten
policy is not to be ignored.

The price is now stated as upwards

of $150 billion for Indochina alone but the full costs of that
tragic adventure will be borne by the American people well into
the next century, with the present price-tag not doubling but
tripling.

The wastage stalks both our national and inter-

national footsteps.

It casts reflections in the ever-rising

prices at home and in the declining value of the dollar abroad.
It has left us ill-prepared for the emerging challenges of a
period of peace.
To be sure, the damage of two decades is done and
cannot be undone .

I have sketched this past of China policy,
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not in recrimination; few of us who liv ed t hrough the p eriod
are completely free of responsibility for the distortions.

I

have sketched it in some detail because an awareness of the
soil in which the old policy was planted is necessary to the
cultivation of a fru itful new policy with regard to China and,
indeed, all of Asia .
As I have already noted, President Nixon ' s visit to
China last year marked a turning point .
brought him public gratitude and acclaim .

The visit, properly,
His greatest foreign -

policy initiative has made possible the narrowin g of t he vast
chasm in Sino- American relations .

The remainin g gap is closing

rapidly, more rapidly than anticipated in the most sanguine of
expectations a year ago .
I n retrospect, it is clear t hat t h e warm reaction at
home to the President ' s initiative indicated that t h e nation
had long-since been ready for a new look at the situation .

What

the President supplied was the missing ingredient--the political
courage to acknowledg e that we had been on the wrong track .
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From the outset, Congress has supported the
President's initiative,

The visits of the joint Senate

leadership and of the House leaders to China shortly after
the President's return underscored the coh esiveness of the
Executive and Legislative Branches on this issue.

I should

note in passing that long before Dr. Kissin ger's visit,
there had been exchanges between the White House and t he
Senate leadership with regard to the desira bility of reestablishing communications with Peking,

In fact, the

j oint effort to open the door began with the first private
meeting between the President and the Senate Democratic
Leader at the outset of his first Administration, in fact ,
in the first month.
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t~

The Pres i dent, howe ver, ha d
f i gure i n th i s devel o pment.

He had

t~

be a nd ha s been the key

put before the ent i re

na t ion a revised est i mate of the new Ch i na.

He had to shi ft

r i tual jzed a tt j tudes by 180) a nd he d i d so, i n my judgment,
wi th c onsummate s ki ll.
Where, then,

d ~ es

C ~ngress

fit i nto the

s i tuat i ~n °

It can scarcely be s a id that whjle the Ececut i ve Branch was
pursu i ng the policy of ostrac i sm,

'a hundred fl owers bloomed

i n the Senate on the

For the most part , Congress

Chin~

issue.

wa s c ontent t o r 1de the policy.

Here and there, howe ver ,

i nd i vidual Members and the Foreign Relati ons and other Comm i ttees
d i d ma ke

c ~ ntribut i~ns

a tt i tudes.

t o recasting publ i c understand i ng a nd

In March 1368, five ye a rs ago i n a lecture at the

Un i vers i ty of Monta na, I expressed the v i ew that
··the ba s i c adjustment whi ch i s needed I n
pol i c i es re spect i ng Ch i na i_ s t o ma ke crystal cle a r
tha t th is government doe s n ot a nt i c j pa te, much l e s s
does i t see k , the
Chi nese mainla nd.

o verthr ~w

o f the government on the

In add i tion, there i s a need to

-14end the

discr i minati~n

wh j ch consigns to China an

inferior status as among the Communist countries
in this nation's policies respecting travel and
trade.

Finally, it ought

t~

be made

unequ i v~ca l

that we are prepared at all times to meet wi th
Chinese
in

representatives--f~rmally ~r

~rder t~

consider differences between China

and the United States
quest i~n

The
s~

has

~f

Viet Nam

~ver

~r

any other

c ~mm~ n c~ncern.

transiti~n

f o ll~wed

j_ nf ~ rmally-

in policy dur i ng the last year or

this pattern closely and the

had support fr om the Senate,

alm~st

t~

trans i t i~n

a man.

In due

I am conf i dent Members of both parties and both
j oin the expanding ranks of travellers t o China.

has

c~urse,

H~uses

will

In so doing,

they will familiarize themselves first-hand with the s ituation and, hence, sharpen the i r understanding
i ng deve lo pments.

The glowing reports of

~f

heret of~re

unf ~ l d-

skeptical

newspaper columnists who have recently visited China indicate
that such visits can serve more effective l y as eye-openers
than what

is

usually served for that purpose at the bar of the
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National Press Club.

China i s, i ndeed, heady stuff and it js

most desirable that, as we

pr~ceed

with the

rappr~chement,

we

open our minds with understanding and prudence.
It seems to me that the t i me is

appr~aching

for

Congress,to supplement a general support of the President's
initiatives on China with substantive legislative action.

The

93rd Congress i s just getting underway, and j t can make a most
useful

c~ntribution

by wiping the statuto ry slate clean

~f

the

anti-Chinese legislation of the past two decades.
The
books.

F~rmosa

Resolut i on, f or example, remains on the

It is a po st-dated check which, for all pract i cal

purposes, gives a Congressional end orsement to the unfettered
use of the U.S. Armed Forces to assist the Chinese National
forces on Taiwan.
questi~n

sole

~f

Under the terms of the ResolutionJ the

how and when

discreti~n

t~

use these

of the Executive Branch.

validity and, in retro spect, it was a
F o rm~sa

f~rces

Resolution is out

~f

i s left to the

Whatever its

dubi~us

~ riginal

one at best, the

keeping with the poli cy which the
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President i s n0w rursu i ng j n regard
o f China.

t~

the Pe 0 p l e's Republ i c

Even if that were n0t the case, I must express

grave reservati o ns wt th regard t o all blank-chec k s drawn o n
the '' war-and-peace ' powers of the Co ngress.

The Fo rmo sa

Res 0lut ion i s rem i niscent, f a r example , 0 f the To nk i n Gulf
Res a lut i 0n which

' greased ' the way fa r the Executive Branch

t o sl i de int 0 the military invo lvement i n Viet Nam.

If we have

le a rned anyth i n g fr 0m that exper i ence, i t o ught t o be tha t the
i n i t ia t ion o f the massive use of fa rce by t h e Un i ted St a tes a t
the s a le discret ion o f o ne branch o f go vernment i s a per i l o us
Co nst i tut ional pract ic e.
The F 0rmo sa Res o lut ion was o r igina ll y des igned f a r
a n emergency, a l mo st a s a pers ona l accommo d a t ion t o

Pres ~ dent

E i senhower ; i t has remained o n the sta tute b ooks t 0 susta i n
what i s n ow a d i scarded po l i cy a n Ch i n a .

In

1 ~ 71

the F o re i gn

Re l at ions C0mm i ttee v o ted to repeal the Res olut ion.
wa s rejected i n the Senate at the time by a v o te o f
t i m~

Th i s act i0 n

43-40.

It i s

again, i t seems t o me, t o put the matter befo re the Co ngress.
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For many years, th i s
ficti ~n

China.

that Ta iwan

sp~ke

In support of that

nati ~ n

he lped t o sustaln the

for the hundreds of millions in
fiction, the United States funnelled

five billion dollars in military and ec onomic aid into an
island whose po pulation at the

~utset

of th i s policy was less

than ten mill ion.

Th i s f t nanc i al stimulus produced spectacular

economic results .

It also served to pay f o r an ov er-s iz ed,

highly
al

mechan i~ ed

G ~ vernment

Army and to keep alive the ho pe of the Nati on-

that these forces wo uld one day spearhead a

return to the Chinese mainland .

That hope has all but di s -

appeared i n Taiwan ; so, t oo , have the fears
i nvasi ~ n

~f

a military

fr om the Mainland.
Economic aid to Taiw a n has now been d i sc ontinued .

Spurred by great i nputs of cap i tal, i n part ic ular,
United States and Japan, the modernized
actually in a

p ~ siti o n

ec o n ~my

fr~m

the

.of Taiwan is

t o extend a i d to less-developed countries

i n Asia, Africa, and elsewhere .

St i ll flowing i nt o the i s land,

however, is U. S . military aid in the f orm of hardware and
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advice~·

on how to use it.

The United States maintains, on

Taiwan, a military advisory group of

165

officers and men.

In

addition, more than 3,000 members of the armed forces are also.·
.r.

there in connection with activities related to Viet Nam.
The deployment of this large force is obsolete in
view of the Vietnamese truce and I am confident that the
Congress will concur in a dec ision to wi thdraw it .

The

President and the Congress, moreover, can and should work
together to bring about the termination of the military aid
mission which remains as a vestige of our past involvement
in the Chinese civil war.
In addition, it should be noted that over $100
million in military grant aid and credit sales for Taiwan
were requested o f Congress for the current f i scal year.

It

is difficult to see the sense in continuing to give away tens
of millions of U.S. dollars in this fashion.

As long as we

continue to provide military aid and adv i sors to Taiwan, we
remain imbedded in what we have now recognized to be an internal
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Chinese af fajr,

There i s every rea s on t o a ssume tha t Ta i wan's

a rmed f orces a re c apable of de f end i ng themselves.

Tn any event ,

t t i s hard t o bel i eve tha t a U.S. aid

pr ~ gra m

any l onger

c onst i tutes the marg i n f or surv i val.

Ways must be found f or

preser vi ng the stab i l i ty of regi ons o f the South China Seas
other than f or th i s nat ion to c 1nt\nu e t o arm a sma l l segment
of Chi nese pe o ple on the i sland o f Taiwan aga i nst the rest.
Although the wi nds of change are sweep i ng away
past poli ci es throughout As i a, st i ll i nta ct i s the r i ng of
peripheral ant i -Chi nese treaties.

From the outset, it seems t o

me, the tac i t assumpt ion of these treat i es i s tha t the United
States i s an As i a power, wh i ch it i s not, wi th a prime responsibil i ty f or i nfluenc i ng and controll i ng change on the Asian
ma i nland.

It i s an assumpt ion which fl owed effo rtlessly f r om

the decisive role of the United Sta tes i n the defeat of Japa n
i n World War II.

It is an assumpt ion whi ch is twenty-five

years old and needs to be exam i ned afresh.
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The United States is, and will continue to be, a nation
with vast interests and responsibilities in the Pacific, interests
which extend to the western reaches of the ocean .

These interests,

however, do not compel us to continue to maintain, as we do,
260,000 armed men on the mainland and off-shore islands of the
Asian continent.

In a time of spreading peace, forces of this

magnitude appear unrelated to any valid interests of the United
States.

On the contrary, they seem more an expensive residue of

the pred.ominant U.S. power which the Untted States asserted in
that region at the end of World War II.
We need to be aware that such residues do not come
cheaply .

They are paid for--the people of the nation pay for ·-·

them--at a rate of many billions of dolla rs each year.

Expend-

itures of this kjnd have something t o do with the rising cost of
food at home and the astronomical dollar price of hotel accommodationsJnTokyo or Hong Kong.

I reiterate this theme because

there is a tendency t o ignore the c os t factors which are involved
i n anachronistic displays of our military power abroad and the
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relationship 0f this cost to the debilitated state of the
economy.

The presence of the flag on the beaches of Asia may

be as thrilling a sight as its appearance on the moon.

In

both cases, however, the thrill carries a very high price.
There is n0 national interest which requires us to maintain
every major U.S. power-core abroad simply because there may
have once been a vital use for it.
In my judgment, the time has long been here for a
deliberate phase-out of all American installations and forces
which remain on the Asian mainland. The 40,000 plus U.S. tr0ops
in Korea are largely an irrelevant luxury, twenty years after the
end of the Korean war.

In the same category are the 45,000

U.S. forces in Thailand.

So, too, are many of the U.S. bases

and installations in Japan.
Treaties are not chiseled in stone; much less are
executive agreements.

The Defense treaty with the Republic of

China on Taiwan obviously needs t0 be re-examined in the light
of the President's initiative with regard to Peking.

In a
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similar vein, the SEATO Treaty has shown itself t o be, i n v i ew
of the involvement in Indochina, not merely an inconsequential
relic of the past, but a devastingly costly enterprise and a
positive hazard to the interests of this nation.
One of the justifications for the SEATO Treaty-which, in . passing, I should note, I signed at the request of
President Eisenhower in Manila nineteen years ago -- one of the
justificat i ons f or SEATO was the high hopes that i t would lead
i n time t o collective security and regional coo peration in Asia.
That hope never gpt off the ground, and, in my judgment, the
tragic war i n Indochina has now delivered acoup-de-grace t o th i s
empty pact, a view which appears t o be shared by v i rtually all
of the other s i gnator i es.
Both treaties should be re-examined as part of a
thr ough, in-depth rev i ew of our overall pos i t ion i n the Western Pacific which
pract i ces.

der i ~es

fr om many treat i es, ag reements , a nd

It is t o be hoped that the Commissi on on the Orga n-

i zation of the Government f or the Conduct of Foreign Poli cy and
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the

F~reign Relat i ~ns

C~mmittee

will pursue intensive studies

of the status of these treaties and other commitments in Asia,
and elsewhere, during the current Congress.
Until the Taiwan situation is clarified, we shall
probably find ourselves looking primarily to trade and other
exchanges for the cement of relations with the new China.
liais~n

The

offices--extraordinary edifices--which will open · soon

ln ~ Washington:and/Peking

will facilitate this process.

countries are carrying out the pledge of the Shanghai
re-emphasied in the February 22 communique,
understanding

thr~ugh

t~

contacts and exchanges.

Both
c~mmuniq~e,

broaden mutual
Fr~m

my own

experience i n China last year, I am persuaded that this
personal interaction can be

~f

great significance.

There is much to be learned from the culture of the
old China.

There is much, too, to be learned from the innov-

ations and practices of the new China.

From accupuncture to

tne recycling of human waste, health, pollution, across the

-24spectrum of the current concerns

~f

Americans--there is much

to be learned from the People's Republic.
lear~

too, from us in science, in
The

cr~ss-fertilization

The Chinese will

techn~logy

and the arts.

of human experiences has

been resumed between China and the United States.
educati~nal

interchange has begun anew.

are on the basis of equality.

This time the exchanges

Thi s time the exchanges can

bring mutual and durable benefit t o bo th peo pl es.
more than l,OJO

Amer i cans--d ~ ctors,

sc i entists , businessmen, and
Four groups of Ch i nese have
I am
t i me.

c ~ nf i dent

that the

The

pr o fess ~ rs ,

p ~ l i t i cal

n ~w

tw ~ -way

Last year,

j ournal i sts,

lea ders--v i sited China.

come t o see us and t o show us.
flo w wi ll accelerate wi th

- 25 Exchanges cost a great deal of money.

I am informed,

for example, that a three-week tour of China by the Philadelphia
Orchestra could cost about $350,000, even with the Chinese
paying all in-country costs.

The amounts are large even though

they are insignificant when compared with the waste which still
attaches to the pursuit of our foreign and military policies in
and around the rim of Asia .
It would be my expectation that funds for cultural
exchange with China could be made available out of savings in
these areas .

Indeed, one of the contributions which can be made

by Congress is to assert budgetary priorities that will bring
about such a shift .

Small investments in exchanges by both

countries, can pay rich dividends in mutual understanding,
friendly contact and cultural enrichment .
A special responsibility devolves on the Congress in
the field of trade with China .

Good trading relations mean good

foreign relations and especially at this time.

The Chinese

- 26 have a record of scrupulously living up to agreements to which
they put their signatures, whether sales contracts or political
settlements .
China's needs from abroad have been deliberately
restrained .

In the past decade or more, the Chinese have looked

to their own resources for economic building blocks, concentrating on developing a largely self-contained productive
capacity .

Such foreign trade as there is remains governed by

two basic principles:

(1) equality and mutual benefit, and

(2) exchange of what China has in surplus for what is lacking .
As a general practice, a rough balance is maintained between
imports and exports.

Hence, China has no external debts of

any consequence .
As economic development accelerates, there may be
changes in the Chinese approach to trade relations with the
outside world .
to be expected .

For the present, however, no sudden change is
Because the doors to America ' s warehouses have

at last been unsealed does not mean that Chinese traders will
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rush to enter and such bill boards as there are in China are
not available for the advertising of foreign products.

They

are used, rather, to stress Chinese effort in production even
as they urge restraint in Chinese consumption.
China's foreign trade is small.

In 1972 the total

was estimated to be $5 billion, roughly balanc ed between imports
and exports.

That amounts to a trade turnover of les s than

one-half of one percent of our gross national product.

u. s.

trade with China has responded promptly to the

removal of the embargo by President Nixon .

At the Canton trade

fair last fall, for example, there were 75 American businessmen,
twice the number attending the spring fair.

From $5 million

in 1971, U. S.-China trade increased to $92 million last year;
$60 million in exports to China, primarily of farm products,
and $23 million in imports from China.

Exports to China could

reach $350 million this year, with the shipment of Boeing 707s
and the sale of large amounts of cotton and other farm products.

- 23 Even the most optimistic

observers~

however, do not believe

China's exports to the United States will exceed $50 million
this year.
Part of the disparity derives from
crimination against Chinese imports.

u.

S. tariff dis-

Until caught up in the

frenzy of cold war, traditional trade policy was to give mostfavored-nation treatment to imports from all countries, regardless of politics.

But twenty-two years ago, the Chinese

mainland, along with other Communist countries, was denied that
treatment.
The President has now negotiated a trade agreement
with the Soviet Union providing for most-favored-nation treatment .

There is no reason whatsoever to do less, in my judg-

ment, with regard to Peking.

It has been estimated that about

50 percent of China's exports to the United States are affected
by lack of most-favored -nation treatment.

The present gross

trade imbalance with China cannot continue indefinitely.

- 29 Either Chinese purchases here will drop or more will have to
be bought from China or new multi-angular patterns of trade
will have to be encouraged in the We stern Pacific.
It would be my hope that Congress will provide
authority to negotiate a most-favored-nation arrangement with
China along the lines of the recent agreement with the Soviet
Union.

Such an arrangement could be consummated, notwithstand-

ing the absence of formal diplomatic relations.

I should note

that with regard to the Soviet Union, the pending trade-agreement
is now clouded by the Mills-Jackson amendment which relates to
the emigration payments required of Soviet Jews seeking to go
to Israel.

That should not deter Congressional action on most-

favored-nation treatment for China.

The two situations are not

analo gous and it would be most unfortunate to lose momentum
which has been generated in the Sino-u.
what is an unrelated issue in Europe.

s.

rapprochement over

- 30 -

In closing) I would reiterate that a China policy
based on myth and self- deception has been a major factor in
the atmosphere of crises in which we have lived since the end
of World War II .

Before the Nixon Administration neither the

Executive Branch nor the Congress did very much to rectify our
relationship with the new China .

The President's initiative

in going to Peking has brought usJ at lastJ to grips with this
neglected situation.

It remains for the Legislative Branch) now;

to take action to remove the accumulated lega l barnacles of the
past .

In so doing) Congress will join tangibly with the

President in normalizing our relations with the Chinese People's
Republic .
In

doing soJ moreover) Congress will contribute to

the improvement of the prospects for peace in the Western
Pacific and in the world .

There is no doubt that what happens

in and around China forms an enormous segment of those prospects even though China eschews the label "Great Power . "
Chinese society) today) is strong and unified perhaps as never

- 31 before in history.

It has a dynamism based on a

and all for one 11 concept.

11

one for all

"Serve the people 11 is more than a

slogan, it is a national way of life.

To visit China is to feel,

personally, the vitality of a vast, intelligent and highly
competent people and the social enthusiasm which has been generated by their new society.

The visible differences between China

today and twenty years ago are stupendous.
ferences may even be greater .

The invisible dif-

All indications are that the

next ten years are likely to add enormously to what has already
been achieved.
We are entered on a new era of relations with China.
We cannot wipe the slate of the past clean and start afresh.
Neither political nor personal relationships are so forg iving.
Even now, we confront a residue of stumbling blocks from the
past, many of which go back to the 19th century in the form of
superior-inferior concepts of China.

The job of removing these

blocks insofar as they derive from official policy and law

- 32 rests with the President and the Congress.
the job is educational.

I n a deeper sense,

As we proceed to do what must be donej

however, the path will open to a new era of stability in the
Western Pac ific .

It will be an er.a based, not on the military

preeminence of any single nation but on the mutual efforts and
forebearance of all t he concerned nations .

There is every

reason to expect that the new China will join with us and
others in building that kind of a peace in the Pacific, a
peace which can be derived through patience, perseverance and
perspicacity .

